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Do Deficits Cause Inflation?
The 1980s in the United States have been a
decade of large federal budget deficits and high
interest rates. Many analysts have interpreted the
high market interest rates as evidence of high
real, or inflation-adjusted rates,arguing that the
large volume of federal borrowing has pushed up
the price of credit. Other analysts, however, have
attributed the high interest rates to investors' ex-
pectations of higher inflation in the future. These
analysts believe investors expect the large budget
deficits eventually to lead to high rates of infla-
tion, not because the deficits in themselves are
inflationary, but because the deficits will lead the
Federal Reserve to adopt an inflationary mone-
tary policy. In this Letter, we examine two poten-
tial links between budget deficits and monetary
policy that have figured prominently in recent
discussions: interest rate smoothing and fiscal
dominance.
Interest rate smoothing
Many observers have noted that the Federal
Reserve frequently conducts monetary policy
in a way that stabilizes short-term interest rate
movements. In the 1970s, for example, the Fed
employed a federal funds rate operating pro-
cedure which tended to dampen short-run
fluctuations in market interest rates. At present,
moreover, the Fed implements monetary policy
through control over borrowed reserves, an ap-
proach that is very similar in its effects to the
federal funds rate procedure used earlier.
A policy that smooths interest rate movements,
however, has the potential to be inflationary,
particularly in an environment of rising real
interest rates. A variety of factors can put upward
pressure on real interest rates, including in-
creases in the demand for credit associated with
larger government budget deficits. To the extent
that the monetary authority attempts to smooth
intere::t rates and resist this upward pressure on
interest rates, it will persistently increase the
money supply. The faster growth in money, if sus-
tained, will, in turn, push ~p the rate of inflation.
Thus, to the extent financial market participants
believe that a smoothing policy will induce the
monetary authority to resist interest rate pressures
caused by higher fiscal deficits, they will expect
higher inflation in the future. Higher inflationary
expectations will then put upward pressure on
market rates, particularly long-term interest rates.
Fiscal dominance
This sequence of events is essentially a story
about the short-run relationship between deficits
and inflation. Economists Thomas Sargent and
Neil Wallace have emphasized that in the long-
run, the actions of the monetary and fiscal au-
thorities are related in a more fundamental way
through the government's budget constraint. In
the short-run, an excess of expenditures over tax
revenues can be financed through the issuance
of debt or the printing of new money. Presumably,
however, the government eventually must payoff
its debt. Sargent and Wallace show that the debt
ultimately must be paid off either by increasing
tax revenues relative to expenditures (that is,
running budget surpluses in the future) or by
printing more money. When taxes are insufficient
to payoff the government's debt, it will be done
by printing more money.
This view of the relationship between deficits
and inflation assumes "fiscal dominance;' that
is, it assumes that the fiscal authority is the domi-
nant political force, and the monetary authority
reacts passively to the deficits determined byfis-
cal policy. Once the fiscal authority sets expendi-
tures and taxes, the monetary authority is forced
to finance any resulting deficit by creating new
money.
However, the government's budget constraint
does not imply that fiscal deficits always will
lead to higher inflation. A politically dominant
monetary authority could determine the rate of
money growth, and force the fiscal authority to
adjust taxes, expenditures, or both, to conform
to the budget constraint.
In considering the implications ofthis theory, it is
useful to keep in mind that the budget constraint
actually restrains only the long-run behavior of
the fiscal and monetary authorities. The short-runFABSF
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1986. The beginning date coincides with the
founding of the Federal Reserve. In order to ad-
just for the growth in the u.s. economy over this
period, the deficit has been scaled by nominal
GNP. The chart is dominated by large deficits
during the two world wars; inflation was also
relatively high during these periods. These epi-
sodes doseem to suggest that budget deficits are
accompanied by expansionary monetary policy.
A more formal, econometric study by economist
Douglas Joines also finds that wartime govern-
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behavior of the monetary authority is not directly
circumscribed in any way. Thus, fiscal domi-
nance and interest rate smoothing both could
operate to produce a positive association be-
tween budget deficits and inflation.
Evidence from hyperinflations
Interesting evidence on deficits and inflation
canqeobtained by examining the experiences
of countries that have incurred very large budget
deficits in the past. In Germany, Austria, Hun-
gary, and Poland after the first World War, for
example, the disruptions and devastations of
the war left the governments in these countries
with large expenditure needs and few revenue
sources. As a result, each ran deficits that fre-
quently were as large as total revenues. In other
words, as much as half of all government ex-
penditures in these countries following World
War I was financed by borrowing.
Sargent has studied each ofthese countries'
experiences and has found that in each case,
the central bank was the primary purchaser of
governmentdebt in this period. This resulted in
rapid increases in the stock of each economy's
monetary base. In Austria,for example, central
bank notes increased by a factor of 39 between
January 1921 and.August 1922. From January
1922 to August 1923, the German Reichsbank's
notes in circulation increased by a factor of
almost 6,0001
Forced to rely on printing money to finance
government expenditures, these countries expe-
rienced astronomically high levels of inflation. In
Germany, which suffered the worst inflation of
the four countries, the price level increased by a
factor of over 25,000 in the period from January
1922 until August 1923.
These episodes provide clear examples in which
fiscaldeficits led to inflation. Unable to raise
sufficient revenue from tax sources, governments
in these countries generated revenues by printing
money, thereby eventually producing hyperinfla-
tions. As Sargent documents, the hyperinflations
ended when fiscal reform allowed budget deficits
to be reduced.
However, there is little evidence of a positive
relationship between inflation and deficits at any
other time. In particular, the post-World War II
period, which has been the focus of most recent
empirical work on the deficit-inflation relation-
ship, shows a divergence between the two. Spe-
cifically, the inflation rate picked up in the 1960s,
reached a peak around 1980, and then declined.
On the other hand, deficits (as a percent of GNP)
were not very large until the 1970s, and have
increased in a sustained fashion almost exactly at
the time that inflation has peaked and then sub-
sided. Thus, for the post-war period, the chart
does not provide much evidence to suggest that
deficits are associated with higher inflation.
The U.S. experience
Obviously, the U.S. has never faced conditions as
extreme as those discussed above. The chart pre-
sents data on the behavior of the fiscal deficit
Of course, the evidence presented in the chart
is only meant to be suggestive. A large number
of formal studies have attempted to determine
whether a relationship exists between deficits
and inflation, generally by estimating reaction
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functions for the Federal Reserve. Ov~rall, how-
ever, evidence from the post-war period does not
suggest any clear-cut relationship between defi"
cits and inflation. While some studies have found
a positive relation between the two, others either
fail to find a significant relationship, or find that
the estimated relationship changes when the
sample period is changed slightly. Economists
Robert King and Nelson Plosser, for instance,
find that while there does appear to be a positive
correlation between inflation and deficits, this
correlation disappears when other influences on
the inflation rate are taken into account.
In general, then, theevidence does ndt suggest
that there is any short-run relationship between
deficits and inflation in the U.S. But what about
the long-run relationship between fiscal deficits
and money growth implied by the government's
budget constraint? Work done at this Bank sug-
gests that the behavior of deficits over time does
not violate the government's budget constraint.
However, this evidence does not necessarily sup-
port the notion of fiscal dominance, since the
budget constraint can be satisfied by increasing
taxes or cutting expenditures, and need not be
met by printing money.
Interpreting the U.S. experience
There are at least two plausible explanations for
the lack of a connection between fiscal deficits
and inflation. First, on a theoretical level, some
economists maintain that even if the Federal
Reserve acts to smooth interest rates, deficits will
not automatically lead to faster money growth
because, they believe, deficits do not push up
interest rates. They arguethat the public knows
higher government expenditures relative to reve-
nues today will require an increase in taxes in
the future. As a result, the public will increase
saving and set aside funds today in order to meet
the expected higher future taxes. Consequently,
an increase in fiscal deficits will be met by a
corresponding increase in saving, and there will
be no upward pressure on interest rates that
could induce the Fed to pursue an inflationary
monetary policy.
On the other hand, ifdeficits do affect interest
rates, the U.S. evidence suggests that the Fed has
not acted to offseuh~seeffects. In other words,
Fed policy over this period has been conducted
independently of changes in the deficit. Indeed,
many observers agree that the Federal Reserve
enjoys a high degree of political independence.
Once again, the existence of an independent
monetary authority is not inconsistent with the
finding that the government's budget constraint is
satisfied over the long run. As mentioned above,
if the monetary authority is politically dominant,
then fiscal policy will have to adjust to the
money growth rate set by the monetary authori-
ties. Other outcomes are possible as well. For
example, some economists have suggested that
the fiscal and monetary authorities could "co-
operate" to jointly determine the tax rate and
inflation. These theories imply that instead of
deficits causing inflation, the two are jointly
determined by other factors such as changes in
government expenditures. We will examine such
theories ina subsequent Letter.
Not in the U.S.
There are at least two channels through which
high budget deficits plausibly can lead to infla-
tion. Moreover, the historical experience of
several countries illustrates what can happen
when governments resort to the printing press to
payoff their bills. However, the evidence for the
u.s. over the post-war period does not suggest
that the monetary authority has been placed in
such a situation. Thus, in the U.S., there is little
evidence to suggest that large fiscal deficits have
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